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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is essentially a collection action. The Defendant, FIA Card Services, N.A.
(hereinafter "FIA"), secured an award letter from the National Arbitration Forum WAF] without
proof of a valid agreement to arbitrate. When a copy of the award 1.etterwas sent to the Plaintiff,
David F. Capps, (hereinafter "Capps"), Capps filed an action to vacate the award letter. FIA
filed counterclaims of account stated and breach of contract to collect on the alleged delinquent
credit card debt. FIA then filed for summary judgment. The district court granted FIA's Motion
for Summary Judgment and Capps appealed.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Capps filed a complaint against FIA and the NAF in the Idaho County District Court on
August gth2007 (R. Vol. I, p. 1 - 7) after receiving an award letter from the NAF (R. Vol. I, p.

33), to have the award letter vacated under Idaho Code Title 7, Chapter 9, Section 912. The
Defendant, NAF removed the action to Federal District Court based on Capps' claim of violation
of civil rights under Article 7 of the U.S. Constitution. Capps subsequently amended the
complaint on October lzth2007 (R. Vol. I, p. 15 - 20) and dismissed the NAF from the action,
substituting a violation of the Idaho State Constitution, specifically Article 1, Section 7, for the
federal claim. The action was then remanded to the State District Court for further proceedings.
FIA filed an Answer to Complaint with Counterclaims on January 30" 2008 (R. Vol. I, p.
26 - 33). The counterclaims included Application of Arbitration Award, Breach of Contract, and
Account Stated.

After initial discovery requests, Capps filed a Motion to Compel Discovery on April 4"'

2008 (R. Vol. IV, p. 594 - 600). The district court granted Capps' Motion to Compel on April
29'h 2008 (R. Vol. IV, p. 601 - 602). FIA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the court's order,
which the court denied in its Memorandum Decision and Order on July 22nd2008 (R. Vol. 111, p.

492 - 498). FIA also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 191h 2008 (R. Vol. V, p.
603 - 604) with supporting memorandum (R. Vol. V, p. 605 - 610). Capps filed his Opposition
to Motion for Summary Judgment on June loth2008 (R. Vol. 11, p. 34 - 51). The district court
granted FIA's Motion for Summary Judgment on July 28'h 2008 (R. Vol. 111, p. 499 - 515).
Capps filed a Motion for Reconsideration on August 51h 2008 (R. Vol. 111, p. 5 16 - 525) wit11
affidavit (R. Vol. 111, p. 526 - 529) and a Motion for Continuance Under Rule 56(f)(R. Vol. 111,
p. 541 - 543) with affidavit (R. Vol. 111, p. 544 - 546). Capps also filed a Motion to Show Cause
on September 11" 2008 (R. Vol. 111, p. 559 - 564), because FIA had not properly complied with
the order of the court concerning discovery. The district court denied the Motion to Show Cause
on October 30' 2008 (R. Vol. 111, p. 565 -566). The district court granted the reconsideration
for the Account Stated claim, but denied the reconsideration for the Breach of Contract claim on
October 30'" 2008 (R. Vol. 111, p. 573 - 580), resulting in a final judgment on Novenlber 12'"

2008 (R. Vol. 111, p. 581 - 582). Capps timely filed his Notice of Appeal 011 November 1 8'h
2008 (R. Vol. 111, p. 583 - 588).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Comerica Bank Bankcard Services originally created the alleged credit card account and the
associated receivables. Both the account and the associated receivables were acquired by
MBNA America Bank, N.A. and subsequently sold to a Master Trust in a process known as
securitization. The securitization transaction took place before the alleged debt was claimed to

have become delinquent in January of 2005. Bank of America acquired MBNA America Bank
on January 2nd2006, at which time the MBNA Master Credit Card Trust TI, used for
securitization, officially became pail of the BA Master Credit Card Trust 11, with the Bank of
New York as trustee. FIA Card Services became the "Sewicer" of the Mastcr Trust nine and a
half months later on October 2oth2006 pursuant to the Second Amended and Restated Pooling
and Servicing Agreement. Despite repeated requests from Capps, FIA has refused to provide
any documents showing that the alleged debt was acquired by FIA from the Master Trust.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
ISSUE N0.1
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT?
Capps demanded a jury trial in his Complaint. FIA filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment, which the district court granted. Capps filed a Motion for Reconsideration, during
which he presented evidence of a dispute of a material fact, specifically, the amount of the
alleged debt. The district court recognized the dispute of a material fact on the Account Stated
claim, but not on the Breach of Contract claim. In determining the amount of the judgment in
the Breach of Contract claim, the district court either had to weigh the evidence, or ignore the
dispute of a material fact. Because Capps had demanded a jury trial, the court was not allowed
to weigh the evidence, nor was it allowed to ignore a dispute over a material fact.

ISSUE NO. 2
DID THE DXSTRICT COURT ERR BY IGNORING RULE 1004(3) OF THE
IDAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE?
Capps provided a copy of a contract in possession of FIA, the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement between FIA and the BA Master Credit card Trust 11, and notified FIA that the copy
was being presented as evidence. The copy was admissible under Rule 1004(3) of the Idaho
Rules of Evidence. Capps had sought a certified copy of the contract during discovery and FIA
refused to provide the document. Capps providedpvimafacie evidence that the document was
what it was purported to be. FIA did not object to the document on the grounds that it was not
authentic. FIA's lack of an objection as to tile authenticity of the document is a tacit admission

that the document is, in fact, authentic. The document is proof that FIA is not a real party in
interest in this action and constitutes a dispute of a material fact, which should have precluded
granting summary judgment by the district court.

ISSUE NO. 3
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR BY IGNORING RULE 1008c OF THE
IDAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE?
Capps provided a copy of a contract in possession of FIA, the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement between FIA and the BA Master Credit card Trust 11, and notified FIA that the copy
was being presented as evidence. The copy was admissible under Rule 1004(3) of the Idaho
Rules of Evidence. Capps had sought a certified copy of the contract during discovery and FIA
refused to provide the document. Capps providedp~imafacie evidence that the document was
what it was purported to be Under Rule 1008(c) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. FIA did not
object to the document as not being authentic and did not provide a certified copy of the
document in its place. The authenticity and weight of the document was for the jury to decide,
not the district court. The document is proof that FIA is not a real party in interest in this action
and constitutes a dispute of a material fact, which should have precluded granting summary
judgment by the district court.

ISSUE NO. 4
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR BY NOT ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF A DISPUTE
OF A MATERIAL FACT, AND THEN USING THE EXCLUDED EVIDENCE AS THE
BASIS FOR ITS DECISION?

Capps provided a copy of a contract in possession of FIA, the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement between FIA and the BA Master Credit Card Trust IT, and notified FIA that the copy
was being presented as evidence. The copy was admissible undcr Rule 1004(3) of the Idaho
Rules of Evidence. Capps had sought a certified copy ofthe contract during discovery and FIA
refused to provide the document. Capps providedpvimafacie evidence that the document was
what it was purported to be Under Rule 1008(c) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. FIA did not
object to the docunlent as not being authentic and did not provide a certified copy of the
document in its place. The authenticity and weight of the document was for the jury to decide,
not the district court judge. The document is proof that FIA is not a real party in interest in this
action and constitutes a dispute of a material fact, which should have precluded granting
summary judgment by the district court.

ISSUE NO. 5
DID THE DISTRICT COURT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS BY RENDERING A
DECISION BEFORE DISCOVERY WAS COMPLETE AND BEFORE THE
CASE WAS RIPE?
Capps raised two aflrmative defenses in his ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIMS (R.
Vol. I, p. 22), inter alia, that "18. The Defendant is not a real party in interest in this action and
cannot maintain a counterclaim Action against the Plaintiff,'' And that "1 9. The Defendant
cannot establish standing and as such cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this court for its
counterclaims." Capps was pursuing FIA's financial records as proof that FIA had removed the
account in question from its books as a result of the sale of the account and the associated
receivables to the BA master Credit Card Trust I1 and was no longer owner of the alleged debt.

Capps filed a MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY (R. Vol. IV, p. 594-600), which the district
court granted. FIA's answers were evasive and incomplete. Capps filed a MOTION TO SHOW
CAUSE regarding the evasive and incomplete answers. The district court DENIED the motion
based on the fact that it had dismissed Capps' claims (R. Vol. 111, p. 565).

ISSUE NO. 6
DID THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY DISMISS THE PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO SHOW CAUSE?
Capps raised two affirmative defenses in his ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIMS (R.
Vol. I, p. 22), inter alia, that "18. The Defendant is not a real party in interest i11 this action and
cannot maintain a counterclaim Action against the Plaintiff." And that "19. The Defendant
cannot establish standing and as such cannot invoke the jurisdiction ofthis court for its
counterclaims." Capps was pursuing FIA's financial records as proof that FIA had removed the
account in question from its books as a result of the sale of the account and the associated
receivables to the BA master Credit Card Trust I1 and was no longer owner of the alleged debt.
Capps filed a MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY (R. Vol. IV, p. 594-600), which the district
court granted. FIA's answers were evasive and incomplete. Capps filed a MOTION TO SHOW
CAUSE regarding the evasive and incomplete answers. The district court DENIED the motion
based on the fact that it had dismissed Capps' claims (R. Vol. 111, p. 565).

ISSUE NO. 7
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR BY RELYING ON AN UNSETTLED CASE
AS THE BASIS FOR ITS DECISION?

Capps provided a copy of a contract in possession of FIA, the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement between FIA and the BA Master Credit card Trust 11, and notified FIA that the copy
was being presented as evidence. The copy was admissible under Rule 1004(3) of the Idaho
Rules of Evidence. Capps had sought a certified copy of the contract during discovery and FIA
refused to provide the document. Capps provided prima facie evidence that the document was
what it was purported to be Under Rule 1008(c) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. FIA did not
object to the document as not being authentic and did not provide a certified copy of the
document in its place. The authenticity and weight of the document was for the jury to decide,
not the district c o w . The document is proof that FIA is not a real party in interest in this action
and constitutes a dispute of a material fact, which should have prevented granting summary
judgment by the district court.

-

ARGUMENT ISSUE NO. 1

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT?
A. INTRODUCTION
Capps demanded a jury trial in his Complaint. FIA filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment, which the district court granted. Capps filed a Motion for Reconsideration, during
which he presented additional evidence of a dispute of a material fact, specifically, the
amount of the alleged debt. The district court recognized the dispute of a material fact on the
Account Stated claim, but not on the Breach of Contract claim. In determining the amount of
the judgment in the Breach of Contract claim, the district court either had to weigh the
evidence, or ignore the material dispute. Because Capps had demanded a jury trial, the
district court was not allowed to weigh the evidence, nor was it allowed to ignore a dispute
over a material fact.

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On a motion for summary judgment we will review "the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, to determine whether there is a
genuine issue as to any material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c); Rcay v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131,120 Idaho 117,814
P.2d 17 (1991).
Where, as here, a jury has been requested, the non-moving party also is entitled to the
benefit of every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidentiary facts. See
Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 660,651 P.2d 923,925 (1982).

C. THERE WAS A GENUINE DISPUTE OVER A MATERIAL FACT.
On a motion for summary judgment there must be no dispute over the material facts of tlie
case and the party moving for summary judgment must be entitled to the judgment as a matter of
law. In this case, Capps presented two dispute letters that were sent, the first to Conierica Bank
Bankcard Services (R. Vol. 111, p. 530), and the second to MBNA America Bank, N.A. (R. Vol.
111, p. 531).
The district court, in its MEMORAMDUM DECISION AND ORDER filed October 30
2008 (R. Vol. 111, p. 573 - 580), stated, "Mr. Capps is correct with respect to his asgunent that
FIA's claim of an account stated fails. I conclude, on reconsideration, that the accounting was
disputed by Mr. Capps." (R. Vol. 111, p. 577, L. 16 - 18). Yet the district court failed to
recognize the same dispute of a material fact in FINSBreach of Contract claim. The same
d&x&e

letters disputed the amount FIA claimed in its breach of contract claim iust as the account

stated claim was disputed.
Capps also provided a copy ofthe Prospectus dated October 11,2005 (R. VoI. 11, p. 71272) and a copy of the Second Amended and Restated Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated
October 20,2006 (R. Vol. 11, p. 273-414) as part of his OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed June 10,2008 (R. Vol. 11, p. 34-51) based on Rule 17(a) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. FIA's sole objection was that the Prospectus and the Pooling
and Servicing Agreement are not based on Capps' personal knowledge (R. Vol. V, p. 640, L. 34). FIA claims that nothing in the Capps affidavit "establishes that Plaintiff has any personal
knowledge regarding the preparation, maintenance andlor subject matter of the proposed
Exhibits" (R. Vol. V, p. 640, L. 6-7). While Capps may not have personal knowledge of the
preparation and maintenance of the documents, he certainly has personal knowledge of the

existence of the documents, and based on the briefing involved, he also has personal knowledge
regarding the subject matter of the documents. The contents of the affidavit certainly establish
that there is a Prospectus and a Pooling and Servicing Agreement (R. Vol. 11, p. 53-55) and that
the contents of those documents are essential to Capps' defense against the Motion for Summary
Judgment (R. Vol. 111, p. 545-546).
An affidavit submitted in the process of summary judgment may establish certain facts
based on personal knowledge that satisfies the requirements of Rule 56(e). In Smith v. Board of
Corrections, 133 Idaho 519,988 P.2d 1193 (1999), the court noted, "Despite the shortcomings of
the affidavits noted by the district court, portions of the affidavits are based on personal
knowledge and do satisfy the requirements of Rule 56(e)." The Capps affidavits establish that
Capps has personal knowledge that a Prospectus has been issued by MBNA, and subsequently
by Bank of America, relating to the securitization process used by both MBNA and Bank of
America for the credit card receivables and the associated accounts. The affidavits also establish
that Capps has personal knowledge that a Pooling and Servicing Agreement exists between
MBNA, Bank of America, and the associated Master Trust for the securitization of credit card
receivables and their associated accounts, the accuracy and authenticity of which is not contested
by FIA.
The documents themselves are relevant to Capps' affirmative defense that FIA is not a real
party in interest and that FIA has no damages, and as such cannot establish standing, thus failing
to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. Whether a party is a real party in interest is a recognized
dispute of a material fact, which would preclude summary judgment, see Tolmie Farms v. J.R.
Simplot Co., 124 Idaho 613,862 P.2d 305 (1992).
In the district court's MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER dated July 28 2008, the

district court judge stated, "Without a proper foundation being laid to establish Mr. Capps'
personal knowledge and without qualifying for an exemption to the hearsay rule, the affidavit of
Walker F. Todd, the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, and the Trust Prospectus may not be
considered." (R. Vol. 111, p. 507, L. 4-7). The district court then went on to say, "Despite my
decision that they are not admissible, I have reviewed in full the Second Amended and Restated
Pooling and Servicing Agreement attached as Exhibit 2 as well as the MBNA Credit Card
Master Note Trust Prospectus attached as Exhibit 1 to Mr. Capps' affidavit as a basis for
deciding FIA's standing and aualification as the real party in interest." (Emphasis added) (R.
Vol. 111, p. 508, L. 17-21). Obviously the district court recognized that there was a genuine
dispute over the material fact regarding standing, otherwise, it would not have seen any need to
weigh the evidence and render a decision. Because the district court judge used the Pooling and
Servicing Agreement and the Prospectus as the basis for his decision, the documents have been
tacitly and impliedly admitted and are therefore "on the record". The district court cannot deny
Capps the right to use the disputed evidence, and then use that same evidence as the basis for
deciding against him.
Capps had demanded a jury trial making the jury the trier of fact, not the district court
judge. FIA's standing and qualification as the real party in interest was for the jury to decide.
Because the district court judge had tacitly and impliedly admitted the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement and the Prospectus as evidence, the weight of the evidence, and the decision
regarding standing and the real party in interest was clearly for the jury to decide.
111the district court's MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER dated July 28 2008, the
district court judge also stated, "Even assuming that the affidavits and documents should be
considered, Mr. Capps still fails to meet his burden of coming forward with evidence by way of

affidavit, deposition, or otherwise, which contradicts the evidence submitted by the moving party
and which establishes a material issue of disputed fact. The Pooling and Servicing Agreement
and the Trust Prospectus documents attached as exhibits to Mr. Capps' Affidavit are cited by Mr.
Capps in support of his affirmative defense that FIA Card Services lacks standing and is not a
real party in interest. These exhibits do not relate directly to whether or not there was a contract
formed and breached or whether an account stated agreement was reached -the two bases of
FIA's motion for summary judgment. See Opposition to Motionfor Summary Judgment at 2-8."
What the district court ignores is that a motion for summary judgment has

basic

requirements: "if the pleading, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of Law." 1.R.C.P 56(c). (Emphasis added). Whether FIA has
standing, and whether FIA is a real party in interest, are jurisdictionaI questions and relate
directly to whether FIA is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In Tolmie Farms, supra, the
court stated,
Courts must take extreme care not to take genuine issues of fact from the jury. See
Wilson v. Westinghouse Electric C'orp., 838 F.2d 286,289 (8thCir.1988); see also Lowry
v. Ireland Bank, 1 16 Idaho 708,779 P.2d 22 (Ct.App. 1989) (a determination of
credibility should not be made on summary judgment if credibility can be teqted in court
before the trier of fact). (Emphasis in original).
In

m,there was conflicting evidence as to who was actually the real party in interest. The

court stated,
"Altl~oughSimplot complains of the dearth of any official documentation to support the
alleged assignment of rights to the Tolmies, such argument goes to the weight of the
evidence and presents a genuine question of fact for the jury."
In this case there is no dearth of documentation. Here the Pooling and Servicing Agreement
clearly states (R. Vol. 11, p. 298),

"Section 2.01. Conveyance of Receivables. The Transferor hereby transfers, assigns, sets over,
and otherwise conveys to the Trustee, without recourse, all of the Transferor's right, title and
interest in, to and under the Receivables existing at the close of business on the Amendment
Closing Date, in the case of Receivables arising in the lnitial Accounts (including all related
Transferred Accounts), and at the close of business on the related Addition Date, in the case of
Receivables arising in the Additional Accow~ts(including a11 related Transferred Accounts), and
in each case thereafter created from time to time in such Accounts until the termination of the
Trust, all monies due or to become due with respect to such Receivables (including all Finance
Charge Receivables), all Interchange allocable to the Trust as provided herein, all proceeds of
such Receivables, Insurance Proceeds and Recoveries relating to such Receivables and the
proceeds thereof." The Transferor is identified as, "BA Credit Card Funding, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability con~pany"(R. Vol. 11, p. 279) and is the company used by Bank of America to
transfer assets into the BA Master Credit Card Trust 11 (hereinafter "the Master Trust").
The Pooling and Servicing Agreement also states (R. Vol. 11, p. 298), "In connection with
such transfer, assignment, set-over and conveyance, the Transferor agrees to record and file, at
its own expense, all financing statements (including any amendments of financing statements
and continuation statements when applicable) with respect to the Receivables now existing and
hereafter created for the transfer of accounts (as defined in the Delaware UCC) meeting the
requirements of applicable state law in such manner and in such jurisdictions as are necessary to
perfect and to maintain the perfection of the assignment of the Receivables to the Trustee,. .."
(Emphasis added). The same Pooling and Servicing Agreement in section 2.05 states (R. Vol. 11,
p. 306), "Covenants of the Transferor. The Transferor hereby covenants that: (a) Receivables to
be Accounts. ... The Traxlsferor will take no action to cause any Receivable to be anything other

than an account (as defined in the Delaware UCC)." In Section 2.09 the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement states (I<. Vol. 11, p. 3 15), "Additional Representations and Warranties of the
Transferor. ...(b) The Collateral constitutes "accounts" within the meaning of the Delaware
UCC." "Account" as defined in the Delaware UCC is, ''5 9-102. Definitions and Index of
Definitions. (a) Article 9 definitions. (2) "Account", except as used in "account for" means (i)
a right to payment of a monetary obligation whether or not earned by perforniaiice, (G) arising
out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card."
All rights, including the right to payment of the alleged monetary obligation, were assigned to
the BA Master Credit Card Trust If, without recourse. No rights were retained. While FIA
argues that the Receivables and the Account are two different things, the Pooliiig and Servicing
Agreement explicitly defines account as defined in the Delaware UCC (R. Vol. 11, p. 289), which
defines "account" as being identical to the Receivables that were assigned to the Master Trust.
In McCIuskv v. Galland, 95 Idaho 472,511 P.2d 289 (Idaho 1973), the Supreme Court of
Idaho held, "Where open account and notes payable to individual were assigned to corporation
prior to commencement of action to recover on the notes and the open account, the individual
assignor was not real party in interest and had no standing to prosecute an action to recover 011
the notes and the open account and was not entitled to recover judgment thereon. Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 17(a), I.C. $3 5-301,s-302,27-104."
In addition, Delaware statute (Delaware is the "home"state of FIA Card Services), Title 6 ,
Chapter 27A, $ 2703A(1) clearly states, "Any property, assets or rights purported to be
transferred, in whole or in part, in the securitization transaction shall be deemed to no longer be
the property, assets or rights of the trmsferor." Clearly, the inference of the above information,
taken in a light most favorable to the non-moving party (Capps in this case) in a motion for

summary judgment, establishes a genuine issue of fact for the jury.
FIA had the burden of showing that there were no genuine issues over the material facts in
its motion for summary judgment. Simply stating that there are no genuine issues of the material
facts is insufficient. Capps had raised two genuine issues of material fact in his affirmative
defenses and had presented evidence in support oEFIA not being a real party in interest, not
having any damages, and as a result, did not have standing and could not invoke the jurisdiction
of the court. The burden fell to FIA to prove that it was in fact the real party in interest and that
it had experienced actual financial damages and in fact had standing in the district court. FIA
presented no evidence of ownership of the receivables or the account, no evidence of damages,
and no evidence that FIA had the right to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court. FIA failed
to prove there were no genuine issues of material fact to support its motion for summary
judgment as required under Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
The district court judge committed reversible error in weighing the evidence and rendering
a decision when it was for the jury to decide. The district court judge also committed reversible
error in deciding FIA had met its burden of establishing that there were no genuine issues of
material fact in its motion for summary judgment when no evidence was presented opposing
Capps' evidence of FIA's lack of standing. Capps therefore requests that this court VACATE
the summary judg~nentagainst him, VACATE the district court's decision that FIA has standing
and is a real party in interest, and REMAND the case for ajury trial.

ARGUMENT - ISSUE NO. 2
DID THE DISTRlCT COURT ERR BY IGNORING RULE 1004(3) OF THE

IDAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE?
A. INTRODUCTION
Capps provided a copy of a contract in possession of FIA, the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement between FIA and the BA Master Credit card Trust 11, and notified FIA that the copy
was being presented as evidence. The copy was admissible under Rule 1004(3) of the Idaho
Rules of Evidence. Capps had sought a certified copy of the contract during discovery and FIA
refused to provide the document. Capps providedpvimafacie evidence that the document was
what it was purported to be. FIA did not object to the document on the grounds that it was not
authentic. FIA's lack of an objection as to the authenticity of the document is a tacit admission
that the document is, in fact, authentic. FIA has thus waived any objection as to authenticity of
the Pooling and Servicing Agreement. The document is proof that FIA is not a real party in
interest in this action and constitutes a dispute o f a material fact, which should have precluded
summary judgment.
B.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When questions of law are presented, the Supreme Court exercises free review and is not bound
by findings of the trial court, but is free to draw its own conclusions from the evidence presented.
Accomazzo v. CEDU Educational Services, Inc., 135 Idaho 145, 15 P.3d 1153.
The construction and application of a statute or statutes present pure questions of law, which
are freely reviewed on appeal. Wilder v. Miller, 135 Idaho 382, 17 P.3d 883.

C. THE EVIDENCE WAS ADMISSIBLE
While case law is lacking in the State of Idaho on Rule 1004(3) of the Idaho Rules or
Evidence, the rule itself was drawn from the Federal Rules of Evidence, retaining the same
numbering system and the same wording. The same basic issue also appears in the Idaho Code,
Title 9, Chapter 4, Section 9-403. This court may find the cited cases in federal courts regarding
Rule 1004(3) persuasive.
Rule I004 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence reads as follows:

Rule 1004. Admissibility of other evidence of contents.
The original is not required, and other evidence of the contents of a writing, recording, or
photograph is admissible if:
(1) Originals lost or destroyed. All originals are lost or have been destroyed, unless the
proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith; or,
(2) Originals not obtainable. No original can be obtained by any reasonably
practicable, available judicial process or procedure; or,
(3) Original in possession of opponent. At a time when an original was under control
of the party against whom offered, that party was put on notice, by the pleadings or
otherwise, that the contents would be a subject of proof at the hearing; and the party
does not produce the original at the hearing; or
(4) Collateral matters. The writing, recording, or photograph is not closely related to a
controlling issue. (Adopted January 8, 1985, effective July 1, 1985.)
In Capps' AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, Capps put FIA on notice regarding the SECOND AMENDED AND
RESTATED POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT as follows (R. Vol. 11, P. 54, L. 2123 and p. 55, L. 1-5):
"33. That I received tile document "SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED
POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT dated as of October 20,2006" in the
process of discovery from MBNA in a previous case.
"34. That the document has not been modified or altered in any manner.
"35. That a true and correct copy of the document is presented as EXHIBIT 2.

"36. That to the best of my knowledge the documents presented are true and correct
copies of authentic documents.
"37. That the documents are intended as evidence and are presented as such."
EXHIBIT 2 appears in the record on appeal (R. Vol. 11, p. 273-414).
Regarding Rule 1004(3), the Second Amended and Restated Pooling and Servicing
Agreement (PSA) was an internal document to MBNA and subsequently, through the sale of
MBNA to Bank of America, is in the possession of Bank of America. As of the date of the
restated agreement, the document was in continuous possession of Bank of America. The above
sworn affidavit providedprima facie evidence to the district court that the document was what it
was purported to be. Since the original document was in possession of the other party (FIA via
Bank of America), the only valid objection from FIA would have been that the document was
not authentic. No such objection was made. The authenticity of the document was therefore
uncontested, and was admissible under Rule 1004(3) as urged by Capps in his Motion for
Reconsideration (R. Vol. 111, p. 553) as follows:
"The original document is in possession of the opponent and Capps has no other opportunity
to obtain a certified copy of the document with affidavits suitable to have the document
entered as evidence. dipps submitted the document with his opposition to summary
judgment, putting FIA on notice that the contents would be a subject of proof at the hearing.
FIA did not produce the original or a certified copy at the hearing and has refused to provide
the docunlent in discovery. FIA has also had sufficient time to object to the accuracy and
authenticity of the document and has not done so. The document previously submitted is
thus admissible under Rule l004(3) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence."
The book, Federal Rules of Evidence, in the section on wrjtings, recordings, and
photographs, page 630, under HISTORY, ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES, Rule
1004(3) has the following explanation:
"Paragraph (3). A party who has an original in his control has no need for the protection
of the rule if put on notice that proof of contents will be made. He can ward off
secondary evidence by offering the original. The notice procedure here provided is not to

be confused with orders to produce or other discovery procedures, as the purpose of the
procedure under this rule is to afford the opposite party an opportunity to produce the
original, not to compel him to do so. McCormick § 203."
In Mack v. Marlel, 241 F.R.D. 534; 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33020; 73 Fed. R. Evid.
Serv. (Callaghan) 446, the cowl stated,

[**I721 Additionally, fHN781Rule 1004 permits proof of the contents of a writing,
recording or photograph by secondary evidence when the proponent of the evidence is
unable to obtain an original through use of legal process, or when the original is in
possession or control of an adverse party that has actual or inquiry notice of the contents
that the proponent intends to introduce the evidence. In the later circumstance, as the
advisory committee's note to Rule 1004(3) points out, "[a] party who has an original in
his control has no need ibr the protection of the [original writing] rule if put on notice
that proof of contents will be made. He can ward off secondary evidence by offering the
original."
Capps provided both actual and inquiry notice to FIA. Actual notice was provided in Capps'
affidavit, supra, "37. That the documents are intended as evidence and are presented as such."
Capps also provided inquiry notice to FIA during discovery, specifically, "INTERROGATORY
-4:

Please identify the Pooling and Servicing Agreement in effect as of July

isth 2005."

and

"REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENT NO. 22: Please provide or make
available for copying a certified copy of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement identified in
Interrogatory No. 4, with proper authentication and foundation from a custodian of records
sufficient to allow the document to be admitted as evidence in this case."
FIA refused to provide the requested document. Capps submitted a Motion to Coinpel
Discovery regarding the Pooling and Servicing Agreement in his SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION
FOR CONTINUANCE UNDER RULE 56(f) (R. Vol. 111, p. 552), which the district court
ignored. Capps' copy of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, the authenticity of which is
uncontested, constitutes proof ofthe sale of the Receivables and the associated account to the
Master Trust, making the Trustee, The Bank of New York, the real party in interest, not FIA.

Capps fulfilled the requirements of Rule 1004(3) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence making the
documents admissible. The district court committed reversible error in not admitting the
documents. Capps therefore requests that this court deem the Second Amended and Restated
Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated October 20 2006 and the Prospectus dated October 11,
2005 as admitted into evidence.

ARGUMENT - ISSUE NO. 3
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR BY IGNORING RULE 1008C OF THE
IDAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE?
A. INTRODUCTION
Capps provided a copy of a contract in possession of FIA, the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement between FIA and the BA Master Credit card Trust 11, and notified FIA that the copy
was being presented as evidence. The copy was admissible under Rule 1004(3) of the Idaho
Rules of Evidence. Capps had sought a certified copy of the contract during discovery and FIA
refused to provide the document. Capps providedprima facie evidence that the document was
what it was purported to he Under Rule 1008(c) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. FIA did not
object to the document as not being authentic and did not provide a certified copy of the
document in its place. The authenticity and weight of the document was for the jury to decide,
not the district court judge. The document is proof that FIA is not a real party in interest in this
action and constitutes a dispute of a material fact, which should have precluded granting
summary judgment by the district court.

B.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The credibility and weight to be given evidence is in the province of the trier of fact, and the

findings made by the trial judge will not be set aside urilcss clearly erroneous. Sun Valley
ShamrockResources, Inc. v. Travelevs Leasing Corp., 118 Idaha 116, 118,794 P.2d 1389, 1391
(1990); I.R.C.P. 52(a). This court will uphold the trial court's findings of fact if supported by
substantial and competent evidence. Ireland v. Ireland, 123 Idaho 955,957-58,855 P.2d 40,4243 (1993); In re baby Boy Doe, 127 Idaho 452,456,902 P.2d 477,481 (1995). On issues of

law, this court exercises free review. Ausman v. State 124 Idaho 839,841,864 P.2d 1126, 1128
(1993).
C. THE AUTHENTICITY AND WEIGHT OF THE EVlDENCE WAS FOR THE JURY TO
DECIDE
Capps demanded a jury trial making the jury the trier of fact. Capps provided a copy of a
contract in possession of FIA, the Second Amended and Restated Pooling and Servicing
Agreement between FIA and the BA Master Credit card Trust 11, and notified FIA that the copy
was being presented as evidence. The copy was admissible under Rule 1004(3) of the Idaho
Rules of Evidence. Capps had sought a certified copy of the contract during discovery and FIA
refused to provide the document. Capps provided primafacie evidence that the document was
what it was purported to be Under Rule 1008(c) ofthe Idaho Rules of Evidence. FIA did not
object to the document as not being authentic and did not provide a certified copy of the
document in its place.
In Fox v. Peck Iron and metal Co., Inc., Bkrtcy., 25 B.R. 674 (1982) the court held, "In a
case tried to a jury, it is for the district judge to determine whether there is prima facie evidence
to show that the document is what it is purported to be and, for the jury, as the trier of fact, to
make its own determination of the authenticity of the evidence and the weight which it believes it
should be accorded. See Federal Rule of Evidence 1008; Alexander Dawson, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.,
586 F.2d 1300, 1302 (9'h Cir. 1978); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 505
F.Supp. 1190. 1219 @.Pa. 1980). As to the question of the existence of aprirna,facie showing,
all that is required is substantial evidence from which the trier of fact inigllt conclude that the
document is authentic."
In Seiler v. Lucasfilms, Ltd 808 F.2d 1316 (9"' Cir. 1986) the court stated, "Rule 1008

provides: When the adt~iissibilityof other evidence of contents of writings, recordings, or
photographs under these rules depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the question
whether the condition has been fulfilled is ordinarily for the court to determine in accordance
with the provisio~lsof Rule 104. However, when an issue is raised (a) whether the asserted
writing ever existed, or (b) whether another writing, recording, or photograph produced at the
district is the original, or (c) whether other evidence of contents correctly reflects the contents,
the issue is for the trier offacts to determine as in the case of other issues of fact." The
conditions in question under Rule 1008(c) are: (1) whether an original can be obtained by any
availablejudicial process; (2) whether an adverse party has possession or control over the
original and, if so, whether proper notice was given to that party; and (3) whether evidence goes
to a collateral matter or to a controlling issue (commentary - preliminary questions for the court,
Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 1008, p. 656).
The issues for the judge were (1) to determine whether the original can be obtained by any
judicial process. Capps had requested thc document in discovery alld FIA had refused to provide
the document. Capps submitted a motion to compel discovery to the court regarding the Pooling
and Servicing Agreement (R. Vol. 111, p. 552). The court could have ordered FIA to produce the
document, but instead chose to ignore Capps' motion. I11 oral argument on September 25 2008
the following exchange took place (T. Vol. I, p. 28, L. 9-25 & p. 29, L. 1-24):
MR. CAPPS: "In addition to this, we have requested from FIA Card Services a certified copy of
the second amended and restated pooling and servicing agreement as of October 20'". I believe
the year is 2006.
"This document is essential in our defense against FIA Card Services, as it shows a genuine issue
over material fact, and that is the standing of FIA Card Services in this case.

"And as a result of our discovery FIA Card Services has essentially refused to provide the
document, and subsequent to that we are subn~ittingto the court a motion to compel FIA Card
Services to produce the document or in the alternative to admit the previously submitted pooling
and servicing agreement as evidence in this case. The pooling and servicing agrecment under the
Rules of Evidence, Rule 1008(c), the weight or that document as evidence or other evidence of a
writing. This also is another issue for the jury to decide the weight of whether this constitutes
evidence or other evidence of a writing.
"So, in essence, what we have at this point is we have at least three genuine issues that are in
dispute in this case, and these issues are for the jury to weigh and decide. And as a result, we
believe that the summary judgment should be vacated and our motion for reconsideration
granted.
"And, in addition, FIA withholding the pooling and servicing agreement when it would establish
a genuine issue for the jury to decide is essentially improper and should not be allowed. They
should be ordered to put that document on the record, or the summary judgment should be
vacated simply on that ground alone.
"THE COURT: We have the fact that you don't have the original agreement, the pooling and
servicing agreement. What was the third?
"MR. CAPPS: The third issue is the offered pooling and servicing agreement as evidence of a
writing or contents of a writing under Rule 1008(c) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. According
to the rules this is an issue for tlie jury to weigh and decide whether it is or is not evidence of the
writing."
The court was obviously aware that Capps was unable to obtain the original document
through discovery, so issue (1) was essentially fulfilled. Issue (2) was to determine whether the

adverse party had possession or co~ltmlover the original and, if so, whether proper notice was
given to that party. It is clear from the document itself that it is an internal document to Bank of
America under the control of FIA as Servicer. The court commented on Capps' extensive detail
in his affidavit and consequently must have been aware that FIA had been given both actual and
inquiry notice regarding the Pooling and Servicing Agreement. The above oral argument also
establishes that FIA had possession or control over tlie original document. Condition (2) is thus
fulfilled. Issue (3) for the court to decide was whether the evidence goes to a collateral matter or
to a controlling issue. The document clearly states that the credit card receivables, and by
specific definition the account itself, were sold to the Master Trust, assigning all rights, title and
interest to the Trustee (The Bank of New York). Under Idaho case law once an assignment is
made the assignor is no longer a real party in interest (see McClusky v. Galland, 95 Idaho 472;
51 1 P.2d 289 (Idaho 1973), supra), which is a controlling issue. The third condition for the court
to decide was thus also fulfilled.
As the commentary in the Federal Rules of Evidence on Rule 1008 explain, under "jury
issues" (p. 656), "If an issue is raised as to: (a) whether the asserted writing ever existed, (b)
whether another writing, recording, or photograph produced at the district is the original, or (c)
whether other evidence of contents correctly reflects the contents, the issue is for the jury to
determine. An example is provided in the Advisory Committee's Note. "If the plaintiff offers
secondary evidence of the contents of an alleged contract, having produced evidence to show the
loss of the original, the District Judge cannot take from the jury the question of whether the
defendant's claim that no contract was ever executed is sound. If the judge could decide the
point, the Advisory Committee states that the case is at an end without ever going to the jury on a
central issue. The same reasoning applies where the question of admissibility is the accuracy of

the secondary evidence. The parties should not be deprived of a jury trial where what might be
thought of as a preliminary issue is also the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. Assume A
and B are involved in a contract dispute, and each offers a photocopy of what each claims the
contract to be. What are the respective functions of Judge and jury? It seems that the Judge
should determine the following question: Assuming that A (or B) is correct in asserting that his
copy is a copy of the actual contract, had A (or B) shown a valid excuse for not producing the
original? If the answer is yes, the judge should let the evidence in for A, and do the same for B if

B makes a similar showing, and let the jury decide which of the two copies actually represents
the contract between the parties."
Capps provided a copy of the Second Amended and Restated Pooling and Servicing
Agreement contract between Banlc of America, FIA and the BA Master Credit Card Trust IS (R.
Vol. IS, p. 273-414), with sufficient pvima facie evidence that the document was what it was
purported to be (see Capps' affidavit (R. Vol. IT, p. 52- 55). FIA did not object that such a
contract did not exist. FIA did not object that Capps' copy of the document was not accurate or
reliable. FIA did not object that Capps' copy of the document was not authentic. FIA did not
object that the contents of the document provided by Capps did not correctly reflect the contents
of the original document. It is therefore uncontested that the contract exists, that Capps' copy is
accurate, reliable, authentic, and correctly reflects the contents of the original contract. Capps
therefore requests that this court deem the Second Amended and Restated Pooling and Servicing
Agreement as admitted into evidence.

ARGUMENT - ISSUE NO. 4
WAS THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION THAT FIA HAD STANDING AND
WAS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL AND
COMPETENT EVIDENCE?
A, INTRODUCTION
Capps provided a copy of a contract in possession of FIA, the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement between FIA and the BA Master Credit Card Trust 11, and notified FIA that the copy
was being presented as evidence. The copy was admissible under Rule 1004(3) of the Idaho
Rules of Evidence. Capps had sought a certified copy of the contract during discovery and FIA
refused to provide the document. Capps providedprirna facie evidence that the document was
what it was purported to be Under Rule 1008(c) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. FIA did not
object to the document as not being authentic and did not provide a certified copy of the
document in its place. The authenticity and weight of the document was for the jury to decide,
not the district court judge. The document is proof that FIA is not. a real party in interest in this
action and constitutes a dispute of a material fact, which should have precluded granting
summary judgment by the district court.
B.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly

erroneous. ... On appeal, this Court examines the record to see if challenged findings of fact are
supported by substantial and competent evidence. Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635,637-38,
132 P.3d 392,394-95 (2006)(citation omitted).

C.

THE STATEMENT USED BY TI-IE DISTRICT COURT IN DECIDING THAT FIA

HAD STANDING AND WAS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST WAS IN CONFLICT
WITH THE CONTRACT BETWEEN FIA AND THE MASTER TRUST.
The terms and conditions relating to the alleged debt and the receivables generated are
defined by a contract between FIA and the Master Trust. That contract is the Second Amended
and Restated Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of October 20 2006 (R. Vol. 11, p. 273414). The district court judge, in his MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER dated July 28
2008 stated (R. Vol. 111, p. 509, L. 11-16), "Nothing in the evidence suggests that FIA Card
Services transferred to the Master Trust anything more than the receivables on Mr. Capps'
account. 111 fact, the MBNA Credit Card Master Note Trust Prospectus specifically provides that
"MBNA transfers the receivables to Master Trust I1 but continues to own the credit card

accounts." Prospectus, MBNA Credit Card Master Note Trust at 23 (October 20,2006)
(emphasis added)." The Prospectus is not the contract between FIA and the Master Trust. The
statement relied on by the district court does not appear in the actual contract: the Pooling and
Servicing Agreement. There is also no equivalent condition, term or statement in the Pooling
and Servicing Agreement.
To the contrary, the Pooling and Servicing Agreement explicitly defines the credit card
account (with respect to the Receivables now existing and hereafter created for the transfer of
accounts (as defined in the Delaware UCC)), which is, ''5 9-102. Definitions and Index of
Definitions. (a) Article 9 definitions. (2) "Account", except as used in "account for" means (i)
a right to payment of a monetary obligation whether or not earned by performance, (G) arising
out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card."
The "account" is the right to payment of a monetary obligation. What is sold and assigned, with

all rights, title and interest, to the Master Trust includes, "all monies due or to become due with
respect to such Receivables (including all Finance Charge Receivables), all Interchange allocable
to the Trust as provided herein, all proceeds of such Receivables, Insurance Proceeds and
Recoveries relating to such Receivables and the proceeds thereof." (R. Vol. I1 p. 298). Clearly,
within the definitions specified in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, the Receivables and the
"account" are identical. The district court judge's statement that "Nothing in the evidence
suggests that FIA Card Services transferred to the Master Trust anything more than the
receivables on Mr. Capps' account." is not based on the facts as presented in the Pooling and
Servicing Agreement.
While a prospectus may be used to clarify terms in a contract, it cannot be used to introduce
entirely new and contrary terms into an existing and settled contract. This is especially true since
the Pooling and Servicing Agreement is dated more than a year a$eu the Prospectus. The district
court judge's statement used as ille basis for his decision is not based on the actual contract
between FIA and the Master Trust but rather on parole evidence that has no real bearing on the
terms of the contract. The district court's decision is therefore not based on substantial and
competent evidence and constitutes reversible error. Capps thus requests that this court
VACATE the district court's decision that FIA has standing and is a real party in interest and
REMAND the case for trial by a jury.

ARGUMENT - ISSUE NO. 5
DID THE DISTRICT COURT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS BY RENDERING A
DECISION BEFORE DISCOVERY WAS COMPLETE AND BEFORE THE
CASE WAS RIPE?
A. INTRODUCTION
Capps raised two afiirmative defenses in his ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIMS (R.
Vol. I, p. 22), inler alia, that "18. The Defendant is not a real party in interest in this action and
cannot maintain a cou~terclaimAction against the Plaintiff.'' And that "1 9. The Defendant
cannot establish standing and as such cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this court for its
counterclaims." Capps was pursuing FIA's financial records as proof that FIA had removed the
account in question from its books as a result of the sale of the account and the associated
receivables to the BA master Credit Card Trust I1 and was no longer owner of the alleged debt.
Capps filed a MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY (R. Vol. IV, p. 594-600), which the district
court granted. FIA's answers were evasive and incomplete. Capps filed a MOTION TO SHOW
CAUSE regarding the evasive and incomplete answers. The district court DENIED the motion
based on the fact that it had dismissed Capps' claims (R. Vol. 111, p. 565).

B. STANDARI) OF REVIEW
A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly
erroneous. ... On appeal, this Court examines the record to see if challenged findings of fact
are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635,
637-38, 132 P.3d 392, 394-95 (2006)(citation omitted).

C. DISCOVERY WAS STILL IN PROCESS
In Dunuiclc v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 882 P.2d 475 (1 984), the Court of Appeals of Idaho
stated, "The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(c), which is identical in all relevant aspects to I.R.C.P. 56(c), stated,
In our view, [FINS] the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of snmmary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. 111 such a situation,
there can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all
other facts immaterial. The moving party is 'entitled to a judgment as a matter of law'
because the nonmoving party has failed to malte a sufficient showing on an essential
element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof. '[The] standard
[for granting summary judgment] mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under
Federal Rule oi'Civi1 Procedure 50(a) ...' Celotex Corp. v, Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23,
91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986) (citations omitted).
The language and reasoning of Celotex bas been adopted by the appellate courts of Idaho.
See, e.g., G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 1 I9 Idaho 5 14,808 P.2d 85 1 (1991);
Barab v. Plumleigh, 123 Idaho 890,892,853 P.2d 635,637 (Ct. App. 1993); Podolan v.
Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., 123 Idaho 937,941,854 P.2d 280,284 (Ct. App. 1993);
Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42,44-45, 844 P.2d 24,26-27 (Ct. App. 1992)"
One of the crucial elements for a summary judgment hearing was ignored by the district
court: adequate time for discovery. It is clear from the proceedings that discovery was still in
progress. The court had not scheduled a time for completion of discovery and several
discovery related motions were before the court; specifically, Capps' Motion to Show Cause

(R. Vol. 111, p. ), and his Motion to Compel Discovery (R. Vol. 111, p. 552).
The implication of the documeilts sought in discovery, as pointed out by the district
court in the MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER of July 22,2008 (R. Vol. 111, p.
495-96), is that "A material fact to these defenses is whether or not FIA Card Services owns
the account in question. The information requested by Mr. Capps in his Interrogatory
Request No. 5, namely the financial records relating to the account i11 question, will help

prove whether FIA in fact owns the account in question. I therefore hold that such
information is relevant." Since the contents of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement detail
the sale of the receivables and the associated account, including all rights, title and interest, to
a third party, it is equally relevant and material to FIA's standing and whether FIA is the real
party in interest under Rule 17(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The fact that the
receivables associated with the alleged account, and the alleged account itself, were sold to a
third party, if proved at trial, would eliminate FIA as a proper plaintiff and also remove the
jurisdiction of the district court.
"Due Process is a flexible constitutional principle, and calls for such procedural
protection as the particular situation demands." In re Baby Doe, 130 Idaho 47, 936 P.2d 690
(Ct. App. 1997). From State of Idaho, Buerau of Child Support Services v. Garcia, 132
Idaho 505,975 P.2d 793, (1999) Ida. App. LEXIS 8, "The essence of due process is the right
to he heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. See also Mathews v.
Eldridpe, 424 U.S. 319,333,47 L. Ed. 2d 18,96 S. Ct. 893 (1976)." "The 'basic concepts of
fair play' are 'inexorable safeguards' for due process." Garvev v. Freeman, 397 F.2d 600;
1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 6309.
When the dishict court ignored Capps' Motion to Compel Discovery regarding the
Pooling and Servicing Agreement in favor of granting suinmary judgment to FIA, Capps was
deprived of the right to be heard at a meaningful time (when the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement would have been properly on the record as evidence) and in a meaningful manner
(with solid evidence on the record that FIA was not the real party in interest and had no
standing). The fact that standing and the real party in interest were issues for the jury and not
the district court judge is additional evidence of the district court violating Capps' due

process rights. To deprive Capps of critical evidence and the cooperation of the court in
obtaining that and additional evidence to support his case violates any sense of fair play and
removes any concept of safeguards from the judicial process.
The district court also granted FIA's motion to dismiss Capps' claims while discovery
was still in progress, ignoring the fact that FIA was evading discovery and violating the
discovery order of the court. It is clear from the proceedings that due process was not being
followed and Capps' due process rights were being violated.
Capps therefore requests that this court VACATE the summary judgment against him,
VACATE the denial of Capps' Motion to Show Cause, REINSTATE Capps' Motion to
Compel Discovery, REINSTATE Capps' claims in his complaint, and REMAND this case
for continued discovery, a jury trial and any remaining procedures.

ARGUMENT - ISSUE NO. 6
DID THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY DISMISS THE PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO SHOW CAUSE?
A. INTRODUCTION
Capps raised two affirmative defenses in his ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIMS (R.
Vol. I, p. 22), inter alia, that "1 8. The Defendant is not a real party in interest in this action and
cannot maintain a counterclaim Action against the Plaintiff." And that "19. The Defendant
cannot establish standing and as such cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this court for its
cou~~terclaims."Capps was pursuing FIA's financial records as proof that FIA had removed the
account in question from its books as a result of the sale of the account and the associated
receivables to the BA master Credit Card Trust I1 and was no longer owner of the alleged debt.
Capps filed a MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY (R. Vol. IV, p. 594-600), which the district
court granted. FIA's answers were evasive and incomplete. Capps filed a MOTION TO SHOW
CAUSE regarding the evasive and incomplete answers. The district court DENIED the motion
based on the fact that it had dismissed Capps' claims (R. Vol. 111, p. 565).
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous.

...

On appeal, this Court examines the record to see if challenged findings of fact are supported

by substantial and competent evidence. Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635,637-38,132 P.3d
392, 394-95 (2006)(citation omitted).

C. THE SHOW CAUSE MOTION WAS BASED ON AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Two affirmative defenses were raised based on FIA's lack of standing: That FIA was not

a real party in interest under Rule 17(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure because the

alleged debt had been sold, with all rights, title and interest assigned to a third party, and that
FIA could not establish standing because the alleged debt was sold, and FIA could not prove any
damages. Without actual damages, FIA could not invoke the jurisdiction of the court.
The fact that the alleged debt was sold is established in both a PROSPECTUS, dated
October 11,2005 (R. Vol. 11, p. 71-272) and a SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED
POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT dated October 20,2006 (R. Vol. 11, p. 273-414).
Capps was pursuing certain FIA financial records generally identified it1 the PROSPECTUS and
the POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT, as proof that FIA did not have the alleged
debt on its books, did not claim the alleged debt either as an asset or a liability, did not have any
ownership interest in the alleged debt, and had no financial damages relating to the alleged debt.
Capps filed a MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY on April 4 2008 (R. Vol. IV, p. 594-600)
seeking the nomenclature used in FIA's record keeping system so the specific financial records
could be properly identified. The district court granted Capps' motion in its April 29 2008
ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS (R. Vol. IV, p. 601-602). FIA was given 60 days to comply
with the court's order.
FIA's response to the court order was evasive and incomplete. Capps then filed a
MOTION TO SHOW CAUSE on September 11 2008 (R. Vol. 111, p. 559-564), asking the
district court to order FIA to show cause why it should not be held in contempt of court for
failure to properly comply with the court's order of July 22,2008. In Capps' MOTION TO
SHOW CAUSE, the issue was clearly identified as being related to Capps' affirmative defenses,
specifically (R. Vol. 111, p. 560), "Capps has raised affir~uativedefenses that FIA 'lacks standing'
and 'is not a real party in interest under Rule 17(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.' In the
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER of July 22,2008 (R. Vol. 111, p. 495-96), the

district court held that 'A material fact to these defenses is whether or not FIA Card Services
owns the account in question. The information requested by Mr. Capps in his Interrogatory
Request No. 5, namely the financial records relating to the account in question, will help prove
whether FIA in fact owns the account in question. I therefore hold that such information is
relevant."'
On October 30 2008 the district court issued a DECISION AND ORDER stating (R. Vol.
111, p. 565), "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to show cause why FIA Card Services
should not be held in contempt of court is DENIED. The issue is moot because Mr. Capps'
complaint was dismissed." As noted in Capps' motion to show cause (R. Vol. 111, p. 560), the
issue in Interrogatory No. 5 was related to Capps' affinnative defenses, not his complaint. The
district court improperly denied Capps' motion to show cause. Capps therefore requests that this
court REVERSE the district court's order denying his motion, reinstate his Motion to Show
Cause, and REMAND to the district court br further processing consistent with this court's
decision.

-

ARGUMENT ISSUE NO. 7
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR BY RELYING ON AN UNSETTLED CASE
AS THE BASIS FOR ITS DECISION?
A. INTRODUCTION
Capps providcd a copy of a contract in possession of FIA, the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement between FIA and the BA Master Credit card Trust 11, and notified FIA that the copy
was being presented as evidence. The copy was admissible under Rule 1004(3) of the Idaho

,

Rules of Evidence. Capps had sought a certified copy of the contract during discovery and FIA
refused to provide the document. Capps providedprirna facie evidence that the document was
what it was purported to be Under Rule 1008(c) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. FIA did not
object to the document as not being authentic and did not provide a certified copy of the
document in its place. The authenticity and weight of the document was for the jury to decide,
not the district court. The document is proof that FIA is not a real party in interest in this action
and constitutes a dispute of a material fact, which should have prevented gm~tingsummary
judgment by the district court.

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly
erroneous. ... On appeal, this Court examines the record to see if challenged findings of fact
are suppo~tedby substantial and competent evidence. Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635,
637-38, 132 P.3d 392, 394-95 (2006)(citation omitted).
C.

THE CASE THE COURT USED AS THE BASIS FOR ITS REASONING WAS ON

APPEAL
FIA asked the district court to take judicial notice of a previous case: Citibank (South

Dakota) N.A. v. Miriam Carroll, CV-06-37067 (Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 35053).
Capps ob.jected as follows: (R. Vol. 111, p. 421) "The Plaintiff hereby objects based on relevance,
to the court taking judicial notice as the referenced case and pleadings are different in its terms
and conditions, as demonstrated in section I above, and therefore are not relevant to this case. In
addition, the referenced case is currently in appeal and none ofthe issues raised by the Defendant
are in fact settled. As such, this court should DECLINE judicial notice."
The court used the reasoning from a case currently on appeal as follows: (R. Vol. 111, p.
509) "The receivables are separate from the account contract and the one can be transferred
without the other. Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. v. Miriam Carroll, CV-06-37067 (2"* Dist.
Idalto, December 10,2007). The record reflects that only the receivables on Mr. Capps' account
were transferred to the Master Trust. As owner of tlte account itself, FIA has standing to collect
tlte debt owed on the account. It is of no moment that FIA contractually obliged itself to transfer
the money it collects on its accounts to the Master Trust."
The Pooling and Servicing Agreement clearly states in section 2.01 (R. Vol. 11, p. 298), "In
connection with such transfer, assignment, set-over and conveyance, the transferor agrees to
record and file, at its own expense, all financing statements (including any amendments of
financing statements and continuation statements when applicable) with respect to the
Receivables now existing and hereafter created for the transfer of accounts (as defined in the
Delaware UCC)". (Emphasis added). In section 2.05, the Pooling and Servicing Agreement
states (R. Vol. 11, p. 306), "Covenants of the Transferor. The Transferor hereby covenants that:
(a) Receivables to be Accounts. ... The Transferor will take no action to cause any Receivable
to he anything other than an account (as defined in the Delaware UCC)." In section 2.09 the
Pooling and Servicing Agreement also states (R. Vol. 11, p. 3 1S), "Additional Representations

and Warranties of the Transferor. ...(b) The Collateral constitutes "accounts" witbin the
meaning of the Delaware UCC."
Account, as defined in the Delaware UCC is, "$9-102. Definitions and Index of

definitions. (a) Article 9 definitions. (2) "Account", except as used in "account for" means (i)
a right to payment of a monetary obligation whether or not earned by performance, (G) arising
out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card."
All rights, including the right to payment of a monetary obligation, were transferred and assigned
to the Master Trust per the Pooling and Servicing Agreement as demonstrated above. There is
nothing in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement stating that the transferor, or FIA, has retained
the account after the transfer and assignment to the Master Trust. The Pooling and Servicing
Agreement clearly establishes that FIA does not own the account.
The reasoning of the district court was not based on substantial and competent evidence and
constitutes reversible error. In addition, this decision was for the jury, not the district court
judge. Capps therefore requests that this court VACATE the summary judgment against him,
VACATE the district court decision that FIA has standing and is a real party in interest under
Rule 17(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and REMAND the case for further proceedings
and a jury trial.

CONCLUSION
The district court made a decision in summary judgment when it was for the jury to weigh
the evidence and decide the case. There were several genuine disputes over the material facts of
the case precluding summary judgment. The district court ignored the fact that discovery was
still in progress, denying Capps his due process rights by granting summary judgment. Capps
had raised at least two affirmative defenses relating to the real party in interest and the existence
of damages leading to a lack of standing. Capps also provided documents in support of his
affirmative defenses substantially proving that FIA was not the real party in interest and did not
have standing. FIA had the burden of proving that there were no genuine disputes over the
material facts of the case, and failed to provide any evidence disproving Capps' affirmative
defenses that FIA was not the real party in interest and did not have standing under Rule 17(a) of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
The district court first decided Capps' evidence (the Pooling and Servicing Agreement
and the Prospectus) regarding FIA's not being a real party in interest and not having standing
could not be considered, and then used that same evidence as the basis for making a decision that
was for the jury to make. The district court did not make its decision based on competent and
substantial evidence, but rather on parole evidence that was not relevant or material to the
contract between FIA and the Master Trust (the Pooling and Servicing Agreement). The district
court also ignored Rule 1004(3) and Rule 1008(c) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence in crafting its
judgment against Capps. The district court improperly dismissed Capps' Motion to Show Cause,
and the claims in his Complaint.
Capps therefore requests that this court VACATE the summary judgment against him,
VACATE the district court's decision that FIA is a real party in interest and has standing,

REINSTATE Capps' Motion to Show cause, the claims in his Complaint, all of his affirmative
defenses, his Motion to Compel Discovery, DEEM the Prospectus and the Second Amended and
Restated Pooling and Servicing Agreement as entered into evidence and REMAND this case for
further discovery, proceedings and a jury trial on all issues.
Dated this z T M d a y of April 2009.
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